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Hoppmann’s research project about conflicting norms in discussion is a promising contribution to 
the study of argumentative norms. As Hoppmann indicates, there are several interesting links with 
the pragma-dialectical research programme. I agree with the author that regarding the code of 
conduct as level 1 rules is not reflecting the most dominant quality of the pragma-dialectical 
system. The rules in the first place are problem valid and that makes them constitutive for a critical 
discussion. Hoppmann is right when he claims that the pragma-dialectical rules for critical 
discussion can be considered level 1, 2 and 3 norms at the same time. The practical choice to 
considering them as level 1 norms makes it possible to compare them on the same level as rules 
for politeness.  
The relationship between rules for critical discussion and politeness rules has been a 
constant issue if not a problem for the design of our experiments conducted in the project 
Conceptions of Reasonableness. In this project Van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels (2009) 
studied judgments of ordinary arguers of fallacious and non-fallacious discussion moves. The main 
questions was whether the judgements are in line with the pragma-dialectical rules for critical 
discussion. As Hoppmann pointed out, this would especially be a matter of norms in quadrant III 
which involves discussion moves that are both unreasonable and impolite. A constant worry about 
the internal validity of the design concerned a very plausible nuisance variable: the impoliteness 
of fallacious moves can be seen as an alternative explanation of the results. This especially counts 
for fallacies that are not only unreasonable from a purely argumentative point of view but also are 
also very face threatening, like ad hominem attacks and ad baculum threats.  
For our current pragma-dialectical research project entitled ‘Hidden fallaciousness’ the 
relation between unreasonable and polite moves (quadrant IV) is also important. In everyday 
argumentative practice, discussants manoeuvre strategically, attempting to hide and mask clearly 
unreasonable moves by presenting these moves in such a way that they mimic reasonable 
argumentative moves. In this research project we try to find out what type of strategic manoeuvring 
is involved in giving fallacious argumentative moves a more reasonable appearance. Politeness 
can be a factor in this type of strategic manoeuvring. We found, for instance, that a polite 
formulation of an ad baculum threat as a helpful advice is generally seen as less unreasonable than 
straightforward formulations of the same ad baculum threat.  
 I would like to make two suggestions for further research on conflicting norms in 
argumentation. First, in his endeavour to trace possible conflicts, Hoppmann starts from the list of 
10 rules from the code of conduct. When contrasting the two different normative systems it does 
not become clear how exactly Hoppmann traces conflicts between them. For this reason it would 
be interesting to start from a list of the dialectically relevant moves that are put forward in each of 
the four stages and that are in accordance with the rules for critical discussion. The starting point 
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in this procedure is not the rule but the type of move that is permissible in the stage at hand. This 
endeavour is made easier by following the dialectical profile for each of the stages.  
A second suggestion for further research has to do with the context in which a possible 
conflict of rules occurs. Hoppmann wonders whether it is possible to explicitly address a conflict 
between imperatives of politeness and reasonableness in a practical conversation. He concludes 
that these expressions seem to make little contribution to either politeness or reasonableness. I 
wonder however whether explicit reference to possible conflicts are just, as Hoppmann calls them, 
stylistic devices. Expressions like “Allow me to illustrate this,” “Forgive me for saying so” and “I 
don’t want to sound rude, and forgive me if I do, but I in my mind you fail to make your point” 
are conventional but they are also functional as signs that the speaker is aware of the fact that he 
is about to make contribution the discussion that poses a face threat to his interlocutor. In that 
respect they are helpful in promoting a discussion that is not frustrated by unnecessary 
communicative obstacles. The impact of possible face threatening reasonable moves seems to be 
influenced by a number of factors. The cultural background is one, but the macro context in which 
the argumentative exchange takes place seems to be even more important. In this respect it would 
be interesting to see how the impact of violation of politeness rules is conditioned by the activity 
type at hand. The explicit and implicit institutional conventions that are characteristic of a certain 
activity type not only constrain the strategic manoeuvring in an activity type but also the rules for 
politeness. Because in some activity types confrontation is a necessary and inherent part of the 
exchange it is hardly a source of face threat. In a legal setting for instance the division of roles is 
such that an attorney would not be offended at all when the accuser expresses doubt about his 
assertions. All that is necessary are conventionalized expressions that are recognizable by all 
parties concerned. This may be different in a more informal discussion between strangers. In short 
I think it is worthwhile to study the impact of conflict and the explicit expressions addressing these 
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